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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the causes of regulatory compliance using 
traditional deterrence variables and potential moral and social variables. Self-
reported data was used to assert the objective of this write-up. A group of 
persistent violators react neither to normative aspects nor to traditional 
deterrence variables, but systematically violate the regulation and use bribes 
to avoid punishment. From the results, it was also indicated that tree hunters 
adjust their violation rates with respect to changes in the probability of 
detection and punishment, but they also react to social and legitimacy 
variables.  It is recommended that if the on-going deforestation, forest 
depletion and degradation are to be curbed, it is essential to have proactive and 
forward-looking policies anticipating social, economic and environmental 
changes to guide the development of the forest sector. Social influence plays 
a significant role in everyday social exchange-the body of empirical evidence 
demonstrates that the pure deterrence model of regulatory compliance, which 
focuses primarily on the certainty and severity of sanctions as key 
determinants of compliance, provides a partial explanation of compliance 
behaviour. 
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Introduction 
Natural resource industries, because of the prevalence of externalities 
and public goods, inevitably become highly regulated. Even where a full set 
of property rights is defined to internalize externalities, it is necessary to 
control excluded users from infringing on those rights. Other industries where 
market structure or public safety and security are potential problems also are 
subject to an array of government restrictions. 
Regulated economic agents are typically controlled through 
monitoring, surveillance, and enforcement. This control is commonly left to 
separate enforcement authorities and not systematically considered when 
developing regulatory policies. There is little or no recognition of how policies 
and the policy process may affect the extent of compliance with regulations 
(Kupera. and Sutinen, 1994). Policy analysis and formulation frequently 
assume perfect compliance can be achieved at no cost. Yet, when things go 
wrong, as they often do, enforcement is cited as one of the principal reasons 
for failure, and more and better enforcement is demanded. This raises 
questions of whether there are ways to improve the cost-effectiveness of 
traditional enforcement, and whether there are ways to secure compliance 
without heavy reliance on costly enforcement. 
Prescribing compliance policy and institutional design requires a 
sound understanding of compliance behavior. Becker (1968) was the first to 
develop a formal theoretical framework for explaining criminal activity. 
Following Bentham (1789) and Smith (1759, 1776), Becker argued that 
criminals behave basically like other individuals in that they attempt to 
maximize utility subject to a budget constraint. In Becker’s model, an 
individual commits a crime if the expected utility from committing the crime 
exceeds the utility from engaging in legitimate activity. Becker’s framework 
became the launching pad for a series of studies on the economics of crime. 
The original deterrence model by Becker (1968) led to a large number of 
empirical papers testing the hypothesis (starting with Erlich, 1973; Gaviria, 
2000 is a recent extension), which by and large confirmed the theory. Whether 
the deterrence conclusion is confirmed has been debated, however, and one 
level of critique is methodological. This critique stresses that the theory is 
developed on the individual level, while much of the empirical work is based 
on some level of aggregation. If crime rate is defined as crime per capita, and 
probability to be arrested is measured as the ratio of arrests to crimes, we have 
the number of crimes in the denominator of the independent variable and in 
the numerator of the dependent variable, which can imply spurious correlation. 
Similarly, if notorious criminals are arrested and kept in custody, it implies a 
lower crime level, but the negative correlation between crime and arrest rates 
is not due to the risk of being arrested, but to the actual captivity. 
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More crimes lead to more expenditure on law enforcement, which implies a 
simultaneous relationship between crime and enforcement levels. Manski 
(1978) suggested survey-collected individual self-reports as a means of 
avoiding these problems, since each individual will have a negligible impact 
on each of the three objections raised. Furlong (1991) applied these ideas to 
Canadian fishers and found the fishers to be most sensitive to changes in the 
likelihood of detection, while fines appeared to create the greatest deterrence 
among various penalties. 
Social science research on why people follow the law has been 
dominated by the instrumental perspective, which is based on deterrence 
literature and reaches the same policy conclusions as the economics research 
following the Becker approach. However, given the weak deterrent threat 
facing people for minor violations, this approach cannot explain why the vast 
majority of people act in a way consistent with the law (Robinson and Darley, 
1997). Recent contributions to legal thought, which to a large extent are 
revivals of older ideas, provide several suggestions. One reason for following 
the rules is to avoid the disapproval of your social group; another is that you 
see yourself as a moral being who wants to do the right thing (Robinson and 
Darley, 1997). A third factor is legitimacy, which means that the individual 
feels that the authority enforcing the law is entitled to dictate behavior. This 
in turn depends on whether individuals think that the law is fair and applied in 
a fair manner. Whether legitimacy is maintained or undermined is dependent 
on people’s experiences with legal authorities (Tyler 1990). 
Enforcement in natural resource industry(ies) has been a fairly 
neglected area (Sutinen and Hennessey, 1986). The early contributions are 
theoretical and deal with optimal stock if non-zero enforcement costs are 
introduced (Sutinen and Andersen, 1985; Milliman, 1986) and the choice of 
optimal government policy (Anderson and Lee, 1986). The first empirical 
study confirmed the deterrence model showing that an increased risk of 
detection and conviction reduce the violation rate in Natural resource 
industries (Sutinen and Gauvin, 1989). The simple deterrence model predicts 
that most fishers will violate the regulation. The risk of detection is low, fines 
are modest, and the profits from violation are substantial. Extended analysis is 
therefore necessary to include both the instrumental and the normative 
perspective. The empirical evidence from such an approach is mixed. Kuperan 
and Sutinen (1998) found that compliance in a Malaysian fishery depended on 
the tangible gains and losses, as well as the moral development, legitimacy, 
and behavior of others.  
Hatcher et al. (2000) reached similar conclusions while Hatcher and 
Gordon (2005) found less evidence in favor of normative influence on fisher 
compliance, while again confirming the deterrence effect. Specifically, the 
model accounts for moral obligation and social influence in addition to the 
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conventional costs and revenues associated with illegal behavior. The model 
integrates sociology, economic and psychology theories to account for both 
tangible and intangible motivations influencing individuals’ decisions whether 
to comply with a given set of regulations. This paper analyzes the causes of 
regulatory compliance In addition to traditional deterrence variables such as 
risk of detection and expected gains from violation, we explore potential 
reasons for following the rules such as being moral and doing the right thing, 
obeying the rules due to peer pressure from other loggers, perceiving the 
regulation as legitimate, and perceiving that they (Feller) have been involved 
in the regulation process. We use self-reported data from Osun South-Western 
Nigeria because the forest reserves are under severe illegal exploitation and 
focus on analysis forestry sub-sector regulation. 
 
Conceptual Clarifications: 
Deforestation 
Deforestation is a process whereby trees are felled for several purposes 
but without replanting to replace the ones felled (Aina and Salau, 1992). It is 
the large scale removal of forests resulting to non forest areas for urbanization, 
agriculture and for some other reasons without corresponding re-afforestation 
of the area (Fiset, 2011). According to FAO (2005), deforestation is the 
conversion of forest to another land use or the long term-term reduction of tree 
canopy cover below the 10% threshold. On a broad sense, deforestation can 
apart from conversion of forest areas to non-forest ones, include reduction of 
forest quality in terms of its density, structure of the trees, the ecological and 
other essential services supplied, biota biomass and species diversity as well 
as the genetic diversity of the composing biota. 
Deforestation is a major problem in many parts of the world, and the 
idea underlying the phenomenon can be a diminution of vegetal covers from 
thick forest to light forest, from heavy or light forest to open area under 
development. It can also be from heavy or light forest to savannah or grassland 
and or from savannah to open or isolated land (Okorie, 2012). 
In spite of the multi-various usefulness of the forest resources, rapid 
population growth and changes in land uses have put the forest resources under 
pressure. For instance, majority of logging operations in tropical countries are 
considered unsuitable and damaging. The widespread failure of forest 
governance – characterized by illegal logging, associated illegal trade, and 
corruption-directly undermines sustainable economic growth, equitable 
development, and environmental conservation. It puts at risk poor and forest-
dependent populations, which rely on timber and non-timber forest products; 
undermines responsible forest enterprises by distorting timber and reducing 
profitability; and results in a loss of government revenue that could be invested 
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in sustainable forest management or general economic development (World 
Bank, 2006). 
 
Forest degradation 
Forest degradation is a process leading to a temporary or permanent 
deterioration in the density or structure of vegetation cover or its species 
composition (FAO, 2007). It results from disturbances that cause changes in 
the forest attributes that leads to a reduced productive capacity of the forest. 
For the purpose of having a harmonized set of forest and forest change 
definitions, that also is measurable with conventional techniques, forest 
degradation is assumed to be indicated by the reduction of canopy cover and/or 
stocking of the forest through logging, canopy cover stays above 10% 
(Olagunju, 2015). In a more general sense, forest degradation is the long-term 
reduction of the overall potential supply of benefits from the forest, which 
includes wood, biodiversity and any other product or service. 
 
Forest fragmentation 
Forest fragmentation is any process that converts once a continuous 
forest area into fragments or patches of forest separated by non-forest lands. 
Fragmentation is a complex phenomenon resulting from dynamic interactions 
between the natural landscape and society's ever-increasing demands on the 
land, creating a mosaic of natural and human modified environments (FAO, 
2007). Forest fragmentation is basically the conversion of large areas of 
contiguous native forest to other types of vegetation and /or land use leaving 
remnant patches of forest that varies in size and isolation. 
 
Statement of the problem  
  Illegal felling and poaching are twin evils affecting resources 
management in the forestry sub-sector. The forest reserves and wildlife 
sanctuaries are under severe illegal exploitation. Ajakaiye (2001) reported that 
in the last years of military, there was collusion with foreigners in felling of 
teak trees across most plantations established in the country in the 1950s and 
1960. Illegal logging may generate employment in the short term but in the 
longer term it can contribute to the depletion of timber resources and the sub-
sequent collapse of forest industries. Every year developing country 
governments lose billions of dollars in revenues due to illegal tax evasion in 
the forestry sector and unauthorized timber harvesting in public owned forest 
(FAO, 2001). Seyer ( 2005) reported that when local people complain about 
illegal forestry activities, the implicated parties often respond with threats or 
even violence. In addition the corrupt government officials sometimes take 
action against local people to pro-tect their interests or those of illegal loggers 
and poachers. Illegal forestry activities cause environmental damage and 
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threatens forests which many people depend on. Though many tropical 
countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America rely on logging for exports 
earnings, illegal logging costs forest country governments at least US $ 10 – 
15 billion a year – an amount greater than total World Bank lending to client 
countries and greater than total annual development assistance in public 
education and health (White and Martin,2002). According to Baird (2001), 
illegal logging costs Indonesia approximately US $ 60 million annually, while 
Richards, Gatto and Lopez (2003) reported that the direct financial losses to 
the government of Hordurasand Nicaragua due to clandestine logging have 
been estimated at US $11-18 mil-lion and US $ 4-8million, respectively. It is 
also important to remember that illegal logging is not confined to the 
developing countries. The Russian Federation is a major timber producer and 
exports, and estimates of the extent of illegal logging range from 20 – 30 
percent of the country as a whole, to around 40 – 50 percent in particular areas 
of Siberia (Brack,Gray and Hayman, 2002,).According  Faleyimu and Agbeja 
ineffective supervision, coordination and control is a major problem for forest 
policy implementation in the southwest except in Lagos and Ogun State. The 
long term fortunes of forestry depends largely on the institutions in place as 
well as the performance of the managers (Adeyoju, 2001;Adeyoju,2005). It 
means that irrespective of the sustain-ability strategy and the enabling 
environment, the human role is indispensable. Also accountability and 
transparency are important component of effective supervision coordination 
and control. The study revealed that inadequate information from policy 
makers is a problem of forest policy implementation. The over whelming 
influence and impact of communication and information for the smooth 
running of business has been acknowledge (CTA, 1997). Such information 
should not be only technically focused but should include economic data, 
policy Statement and regulations guiding the use of such resources. These 
industries and timber trade are important because they engaged many people 
in the lower income groups. According to Areola (1991), estimates of people 
engaged in different types of forestry activities were 170,000 in 1933, it 
increased to 360,000 in 1947 and to 586,000 in 1966 by 1983 it jumped to over 
1,000,000 the figure must be much more higher than that now. 
Exploitation of forest resources often causes deforestation, which has 
been a big problem in this Nation. Nigeria destroys 600,00ha of forest annually 
whereas only 25,000ha are replenished (FAO, 1983).This is often done to 
service wood base industries apart from fuel. However, a huge sum of N180 
Billion is lost annually to deforestation (Eboh, 2005). Deforestation has 
increased real fuel wood prices in the last two decades and this result in an 
estimated loss of between N45 to 60 billion annually. 
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This economic cost of fuel wood losses per year was estimated by the increase 
in the cost of fuel wood supply taking into account, the increase in the cost of 
collecting the wood and the transportation costs. The lost of forest has also 
reduced access to and supplies of non-timber food products for export by as 
much as 40-50 percent in the last five years. This implies that in due course, 
Nigeria will depend on importation of wood and wood products, plunging the 
country into imbalance trade depleting the nation’s foreign reserve. 
 
Description of Area of Study 
The Study Area 
The study area is Osun state. It is located in the Southwestern geo-
political zone. Osun State has an estimated population of 3,423,535(National 
Population Commission, 2006). The capital is Osogbo. The state which is 
made up of 30 local government council lies between longitude 40 and 60 east 
of the Greenwich Meridian, latitude 50 and 80- north of the equator. This 
means that the state lies entirely in the tropics. The state is bounded in the 
West by Oyo State, in the North by Kwara State, in the East by Ondo State 
and in the South by Ogun State. Agriculture is the traditional occupation of 
the people of Osun State. The tropical nature of the climate favours the growth 
of a variety of food and cash crops. The main cash crops include cocoa, palm 
produce, kola, while food crops include yam, maize, cassava, millet, rice and 
plantain. The vegetation consists of high forest and derived savannah towards 
the north. The climate is tropical with two distinct seasons. Usually the wet 
season last between March and October, while the dry season comes between 
November and February. Mean annual rainfall is between 2,000 and 
2,2000mm. Maximum temperature is 32.5OC while the relative humidity is 
79.90percent. Osun state has been divided by OSSADEP into three 
agricultural zones and twenty five blocks (25) blocks. These are Osogbo (6 
blocks), Ife/Ijesha (12 blocks) and Iwo (7 blocks). The study area was chosen 
because it was recognised as one of the major timber producing state with 
forest related environmental issues in the past and present (Agbeja, 2008). 
 
Data Collection  
Field survey, which entails detailed appraisal of the various aspects of 
the forest policy implementation, were carried out through the use of 
structured questionnaire containing both open and close ended questions and 
opinion/target group discussions to gather relevant data from forest stake-
holders in Osun South-Western Nigeria. 
 
Population and Sample  
Primary data needed for the study were collected through multistage 
random sampling- where the study area is first stratified into zones, and each 
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were further stratified into forestry administrative Zones: Ife, Ilesa, 
Ikirun,Osogbo, Iwo and Ede (FOMECU ,1998). 
 
Survey Description and Data 
The data for this study was collected using a questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was administered in face-to-face interviews with loggers with 
an assurance of individual anonymity and confidentiality. Consideration was 
taken in the design of the questionnaire to maximize the likelihood of honest 
responses, in particular regarding questions about the loggers’ own violation 
behavior. The respondents were asked about their own violation rates during 
the last twelve-month period and gave answers such as “zero,” “one month,” 
“two to three months” or “twelve months,” .Three subgroups were identified, 
which were labeled non-violators, alternating violators, and persistent 
violators, with zero, one to ten months, and eleven months or more of 
violation, respectively. Zero violation means that the respondent has not 
broken violations for the past twelve months; one month means that in the past 
twelve months he broke violations only one month, and so on. Interviews were 
carried out individually and included questions on respondent attitudes and 
perceptions about the legitimacy of loggers size regulation, social pressures to 
comply, attitudes towards violation and feelings of obligation to comply. The 
questionnaire design was to a large extent based on the questionnaire used by 
Kuperan and Sutinen (1998) and Håkan and Razack (2004) .  Questions related 
to legitimacy concerned the perceived effectiveness and fairness of loggers 
size regulations, the legitimacy of management institutions, and the 
involvement of loggers in the management. 
These questions were statements for which the respondents ranked 
their level of agreement on a four-digit scale, where a higher score means 
stronger agreement. Socioeconomic characteristics of the loggers were 
recorded either directly, (e.g., age and experience as a skipper, household 
size), or where appropriate, using an interval scale, e.g., household income 
was recorded in this way to minimize the concern of confidentiality and 
accuracy. 
We also included questions related to the subjective probability of 
detection, arrest and conviction. Respondents were asked to report their own 
compliance behaviors as well as their perceptions of other loggers’ compliance 
behavior at the same forest. Further, questions related to the level of loggers’ 
involvement in policy formulation and enforcement were asked. Self-reports 
may imply a risk of biased data, especially as respondents were asked about 
their own illegal activities, but the overall impression was that the loggers were 
cooperative and generous with their answers, including their own violations.  
Prescribing compliance policy and institutional design requires a 
sound understanding of compliance behavior. Becker (1968) was the first to 
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develop a formal theoretical framework for explaining criminal activity. 
Following Bentham (1789) and Smith (1759, 1776), Becker argued that 
criminals behave basically like other individuals in that they attempt to 
maximize utility subject to a budget constraint. In Becker’s model, an 
individual commits a crime if the expected utility from committing the crime 
exceeds the utility from engaging in legitimate activity. Becker’s framework 
became the launching pad for a series of studies on the economics of crime 
(Heineke, 1978; Pyle 1983;Anderson and Lee, 1986 and Milliman, 1986).  
The basic deterrence framework used in these studies assumes that the threat 
of sanctions is the only policy mechanism available to improve compliance 
with regulations. The basic deterrence model, however, has at least two 
important shortcomings: first, the model does not explain the available 
evidence very well and, second, the policy prescriptions of the model are not 
very practical. Low expected penalties do not always result in high levels of 
non-compliance; and prescriptions for more enforcement inputs and higher 
penalties are usually unfeasible or not cost-effective (Viswanathan,Sutinen 
and Kuperan, 1998). In an attempt to overcome these and other shortcomings, 
this paper presents an enriched model of compliance behavior as regard 
deforestation in which rational individuals are driven by both intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations (including, but not restricted to, wealth enhancement). 
The model integrates sociology, economics and psychology theories to 
account for both tangible and intangible motivations influencing individuals’ 
decisions whether to comply with a given set of regulations. Specifically, the 
model accounts for moral obligation and social influence in addition to the 
conventional costs and revenues associated with illegal behavior. 
 
Methodology 
  The original deterrence model by Becker (1968) led to a large number 
of empirical papers testing the hypothesis (starting with Erlich, 1973; Gaviria, 
2000 is a recent extension), which by and large confirmed the theory. Whether 
the deterrence conclusion is confirmed has been debated, however, and one 
level of critique is methodological. This critique stresses that the theory is 
developed on the individual level, while much of the empirical work is based 
on some level of aggregation. If crime rate is defined as crime per capita, and 
probability to be arrested is measured as the ratio of arrests to crimes, we have 
the number of crimes in the denominator of the independent variable and in 
the numerator of the dependent variable, which can imply spurious correlation. 
Similarly, if notorious criminals are arrested and kept in custody, it implies a 
lower crime level, but the negative correlation between crime and arrest rates 
is not due to the risk of being arrested, but to the actual captivity. 
Finally, more crimes lead to more expenditures on law enforcement, 
which implies a simultaneous relationship between crime and enforcement 
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levels. Manski (1978) suggested survey-collected individual self-reports as a 
means of avoiding these problems, since each individual will have a negligible 
impact on each of the three objections raised. Furlong (1991) applied these 
ideas to Canadian fishers and found the fishers to be most sensitive to changes 
in the likelihood of detection, while fines appeared to create the greatest 
deterrence among various penalties. 
Social science research on why people follow the law has been 
dominated by the instrumental perspective, which is based on deterrence 
literature and reaches the same policy conclusions as the economics research 
following the Becker approach. However, given the weak deterrent threat 
facing people for minor violations, this approach cannot explain why the vast 
majority of people act in a way consistent with the law (Robinson and Darley, 
1997). Recent contributions to legal thought, which to a large extent are 
revivals of older ideas, provide several suggestions. One reason for following 
the rules is to avoid the disapproval of your social group; another is that you 
see yourself as a moral being who wants to do the right thing (Robinson and 
Darley, 1997). A third factor is legitimacy, which means that the individual 
feels that the authority enforcing the law is entitled to dictate behavior. This 
in turn depends on whether individuals think that the law is fair and applied in 
a fair manner. Whether legitimacy is maintained or undermined is dependent 
on people’s experiences with legal authorities (Tyler, 1990). 
The theoretical model that we follow is the one which extends the 
neoclassical utilitarian model of individual violation behavior to include 
normative and social judgments (Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999; Hatcher and 
Gordon, 2005), of the form: 
Vi = f (Yi, Di, Mi, Li, Si X),                                       (1) 
where Vi is a self-reported violation rate, Yi is the variable related to the 
financial incentive to violate, Di is a vector of deterrence variables such as the 
probability of detection and the expected fine if detected, Mi is a vector of 
variables measuring moral obligation to comply, 
Li is a vector of variables trying to capture perceived regulatory legitimacy; Si 
is a vector of social influence variables and X measure personal 
characteristics. The hypotheses of interest in this study therefore are: 
∂Vi 
∂Yi
> 0,
∂Vi 
∂Di 
< 0,
∂Vi 
∂Mi 
< 0,
∂Vi 
∂Li 
< 0,
∂Vi 
∂Si 
< 0. 
The main assumption here is that higher measurements of Mi, Si and 
Li correspond, respectively, to: stronger moral judgments against violation, 
perceptions of stronger social norms against violation and increasingly 
positive judgments concerning legitimacy of regulations and of the regulating 
authorities. It must be pointed out that we do not have prior predictions of the 
direction of the X variables. 
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Econometric specification 
The point of departure is that the dependent variable, violation, is a 
latent variable that describes the degree to which Loggers are in violation of 
the forest management regulation. The violation is measured in the number of 
months in which the Loggers violated the forestry regulation. The values 
therefore range from 0 for non-violators to 12 months for persistent violators. 
In general we specify our model as: 
Vi=Xi’β+ε ,                                                             (2) 
where X is a vector of an observable variable possibly governing V and ε is 
normally distributed with mean 0, and standard deviation σ. Data on V are only 
observed when V = j for some j in (0, 1, 2), where 0 is for non-violators, 1 is 
for those who violated for one to ten months (occasional violators) and 2 is for 
those who violated for eleven months or more (persistent violators). We are 
interested in why loggers may choose to comply rather than violate the rules 
and vice versa. It is often found that for any regulation there is a small 
subgroup of persistent violators (Feldman, 1993), a condition which seems 
also to exist in forestry. Also, those who always obey the rules may on some 
occasions be attracted to deviate from their normal behavior, but lack the 
possibility to do so. A simple reason could be that they do not possess the 
illegal (legal) gear, which implies that the model will fit those who actually 
alternate between legal and illegal acts. Excluding the others would be a waste 
of information and lead to biased estimates, as there is self-selected 
participation. In this study we use the generalized Heckman procedure 
(Heckman, 1979). In the first step, the probability that a given individual 
Loggers will violate the forestry regulation is determined from an ordered 
probit model using all available observations in the three categories. In the 
second step, the inverse Mills ratio term is used as an instrument variable in 
the regression on the sub-sample of occasional violators to correct for bias. 
Using the least square method has the advantage that it allows us to directly 
interpret the parameter in the selection model as a conditional marginal effect. 
The ordered probit model is: 
V*= xi’β+u ,                                                             (3) 
              0 𝑖𝑓 𝑣 ∗     ≤   μ1
      𝑉 =    1 𝑖𝑓μ1            <           v*< μ2  
             2 𝑖𝑓 𝑣 ∗   ≥ μ2
 
where V* is not observed and V is its observed counterpart, xi is a vector of 
explanatory variables μ1 and μ2 are threshold parameters to be estimated with 
the βs’, the subscript і is the index of the individual and the error term u is 
distributed as standard normal (Greene, 
2000). 
NOTE: 
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λ (x) = (X )/[1- (X ) ], where X is a vector of regressors related to the violation 
decision,   is the standard normal probability density function, and  is the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
 
Results 
The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. The sample consists 
of 222 loggers of whom 48% are non-violators, 46% are occasional violators 
and 6% persistent violators. The overall violation rate is 29%.  
Table 1: Descriptive of Variables Included in the Estimations 
Name                                                                          Variable description                                       
AGE                                                                             Age of the Loggers                                                    
EDL                                                                            Education Level                                          
YLELB                                                       Years of Loggers Experience In Log Bussiness       
LAMIS                                                    Loggings As Main Income Source (1/0)                 
POLDCA                                                Presence Of Loggers During Cutting Activity (1/0)                         
DFOVU                                                    Dummy For Operational Vehicle Use                                             
DFTTF                                                        Dummy For Targeting Thick Forest                                               
DFIZ                                                                        Dummy For Ife Zone                                                               
DFILZ                                                                      Dummy For Ilesa Zone                                                               
DFIKZ                                                                     Dummy For Ikirun Zone                                                               
DFOZ                                                                       Dummy For Osogbo Zone                                                           
DFIWZ                                                                     Dummy For Iwo Zone                                                           
DFEZ                                                                        Dummy For Ede Zone                                                                   
Deterrence variables 
NTFOSDA           Number of times the loggers have seen the forest officials during activities   
ECPUM                                Expected difference in value of logs between illegal and legal. 
NOARDPY                                                             Number of arrests during the past year 
SPROBD                                                              Subjective probability of being detected 
SPROBAID                                         Subjective probability of being arrested if detected 
SPROBTCIA                              Subjective probability of being taken to court if arrested 
SPROBFGIC                                     Subjective probability of being found guilty in court   
Social variables 
EOAFMU                                                        Existence of active forest management unit 
POLPAVR                               Percentage of loggers perceived as violating the regulation  
PATV                                       Peer attitudes towards violation (1=wrong; 0=not wrong) 
Legitimacy variables 
LVIEW                                         Loggers’ views are considered in regulation design (1/0) 
GRIIR                                                          Government regulatory imposition is right (1/0)   
IREN                                                         Inconsistency in regulatory enforcement      (1/0)                 
FOFR                                                       Fairness of the forest regulation                     (1/0) 
FRAWOA                                                          Forest regulations are well-being of all (1/0) 
LSRAWF                                               Log size regulations are the well-being of few (1/0) 
LSRTEFM                                           Logs size regulation is not an effective measure (1/0)         
PENALFO                                                  Penalty given to violators ‘fits’ the offence (1/0)                    
EIYAIA                                        Enforcement in your forest area is adequate (1/0)                    
MVAND                                                 Many of the violators are not detected (1/0)                    
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The variables which have to do with deterrence include aspects such 
as the expected gain per unit effort from violating, how often officials have 
been seen, a dummy for previous arrest, and the respondent’ s subjective 
judgment of probability of detection, of arrest, of being taken to court, and of 
being found guilty. The probabilities are increasing, which is intuitive; those 
who are more likely to be convicted will more likely be brought through the 
legal procedures. 
The probability of being taken to court is an exception and is lower 
than that of being arrested. This is the stage where bribes are most likely to 
occur and it may be that the respondents have adjusted for the use of bribes. If 
we disregard the effects of bribes, the average perceived overall probability of 
being detected and punished is 6%, which is substantially larger than the “ 
below 1 percent, and often at or near zero” found in previous  measured by a 
four-digit scale. However, in the final analysis these answers were recorded as 
dummy variables with levels three and four being one and levels one and two 
being zero, where one indicates that the fisher agrees with the statement. The 
correlation between all of the used variables was estimated, but did not exceed 
0.54. 
Table 2. Ordered Probit Probality of the Violation Category Model 
Variable                      Coefficient             |P[|Z|>z]  
Constant                                   -0.508**                                                     0.014 
EDL                                           0.029                                      0.012 
YLELB                                        0.004                                                       0.282 
POLDCA                                 -0.222***                                                   0.000 
DFOVU 0.283***                                                 0.000 
DFTTF 0.285***                                                 0.000 
DFIZ                                            0.265***                                                 0.000 
DFILZ 0.025                                                     0.014 
DFIKZ 0.029      0.012 
DFOZ 0.066                                                     0.012 
DFIWZ 0.123**        0.017 
DFEZ                                            0.211***                                               0.002 
 
Deterrence variables 
NTFOSDA                                    0.026                                                   0.112 
 EDIVOBLAI                                0.0034***                                           0.000 
 SPROBD                           0.0571                                                0.270 
SPROBAID                                   -0.013   0.429 
SPROBTCI                                    -0.109                                                 0.082 
SPROBFGIC                   -0.016     0.416 
Social variables  
EOAFMU                                        0.066                                                0.328 
POLPAVR                                    0.165**                                                0.020  
PATV                                          0 .149                                                  0.144 
LAMI                                             0.034                                            0.328 
Legitimacy variables 
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LVIEW                                          -0.086                      0.082 
GRIIR                                            -0.012                                      0.378 
IREN                                               0.967                                0.479 
FOFR                                            -0.126**                                 0.024 
FRAWOA                                      -0.111                              0.053 
LSRAWF                                        0.211***                                0.002 
LSRTEFM                                      -0.084                              0.073 
PENALFO                                  -0.155***                                0.004 
EIYAIA                                         0.088                               0.059 
MVAND                                       0.123**                                              0.017 
µ                                                   0.868***                                           0.000 
Number of observations                                                                           222 
Log likelihood function                                                                        -178.19 
Prob [chiSqd]>value                                                                               0.000 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The results of the first stage ordered Probit Model are presented in 
Table 2 above. Cut-off points were tested without any major difference in the 
parameter estimates or the level of significance. A highly significant estimate 
of indicates that the three categories (in the response are indeed ordered (Liao, 
1994 and Håkan and Razack, 2004). In the model, the dependent variable is 
an ordered rank of violation frequency where non-violation has a rank of zero, 
one to ten months of violation has a rank of one, and eleven months or more 
during the last twelve month period receives a rank of two. Many of the 
variables are statistically significant and significant variables can be found in 
all of the four variable subgroups, i.e., socioeconomic, deterrence, social and 
legitimacy variables 
Table 3. Marginal Effects of Significant Variables. 
                                 Non-Violators       Occasion violators          Persistent violators 
Variables                          Coefficient 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
EDL                      -0.025***                       0.008***                               0.002 
POLDCA        0.092***                            -0.060***                        -0.019** 
DFOVU            -0.117***                      0.079***                          0.022** 
DFIZ                     -0.127 ***                      0.074***                             0.0258** 
DFIZ                     -0.076***                          0.047***                         0.013 
DFEZ                      0.053***                      -0.037***                       -0.009 
DETERRENCE VARIABLES 
ECPUM                     -0.003***                             0.002***                         0.001 
SOCIAL VARIABLES 
POLPAVR                -0.069**          0.047                             0.013 
LEGITIMACY VARIABLES 
FOFR                    0.053***                             -0.037***                         -0.009  
LSRAWF    -0.089***                      0.064***                                0.014 
EIYAIA            0.064***                                     -0.044***                           -0.0125 
PENALFO            -0.051***                      0.0351***                           0.010 
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Table 3 depicts the marginal effects for the statistically significant 
variables, which measure the increased (decreased) probability that the loggers 
would have been in the violation category, given one more unit of the 
explanatory variable with the other variables held at their mean. The binary 
variables, show increase (decrease) in probability if the binary variable is 
equal to one. For example, the marginal value for non-violation for education 
is -0.025 (negative), which indicates that the probability for a logger being a 
non-violator will decrease by 2.08% for every extra year of schooling he gets. 
The probability of being in the group of persistent violators is higher if the 
logger possesses a motor and is from the Ife Zone. Otherwise, explanatory 
variables are not significant for this group. Whether a logger always obeys the 
regulations is significantly indicated by a number of variables. More 
education, being from Ife Zone and possession of a vehicle imply a reduced 
probability of always obeying the law, while having the owner around during 
the logging supports non-violation. Among the deterrence variables, only 
ECPUM is significant, which indicates that if the expected gains between legal 
and illegal behavior are increasing, then more non-violators are likely to 
become alternating violators. 
Several of the social and legitimacy variables are significant, 
indicating that these variables have an impact on the decision to be a non-
violator or to consider breaking the rules. The significant variable POLPAVR 
indicates that the higher the perceived percentage of loggers violating, the 
lower the probability for the logger to remain a non-violator. 
Also, if loggers think that log regulation improves the well-being of a 
few well established loggers (LSRAWF), they are likely to be alternating 
violators. If the log size regulation is seen as a fair regulation (FOFR) and the 
enforcement in their forest area is adequate (EIYAIA), loggers are likely to be 
non-violators. The penalty (PENALFO) variable has an unexpected 
significant positive sign for alternating violators, indicating that loggers who 
believe that the penalty fits the offense are more prone to break the rule. 
Kuperan and Sutinen (1998) suggest that weak enforcement combined with 
high social and moral compliance increases the marginal value of violation, 
which explains why violators are in favor of the measures. The violators enjoy 
better returns from violating when not all loggers violate due to a suitable 
penalty. It can be that non-violators think that the penalties are too low while 
violators think they are low enough to make violation profitable.  
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Table 4. Least Squares Estimates of Violation Frequency. 
Variable                                          Coefficient                        P-Value 
Constant                                              511***                         0.000 
Socio-economic variables 
AGE                                             -0.002                                       0.089 
YLELB                                             0.006 **                         0.005 
TTF                                           -0.232 ***                         0.000 
IZ                             0.025                                       0.190 
ILZ                                          0.101*                                       0.084 
IKZ                                                 0.022                                       0.893 
OZ                                                  0.054                                       0.232 
IWZ                                          0.061                                       0.702 
EZ                                         0.017**                                           0.000 
 
Deterrence variables  
NTFOSDA                        0.070***                                      0.005 
ECPUM                             0.001***                                          0.006 
NOARDPY                       -0.146***                                      0.002 
SPROBD                        -0.070*                                      0.030 
SPROBAID                        -0.069*                                      0.025 
SPROBTCIA                         0.028                                      0.170 
SPROBFGIC                         0.055                                      0.057 
Social variables 
EOAFMU                       -0.020                                      0.182 
POLPAVR                        0.095***                                      0.002 
PATV                        -0.054                                                0.156 
Legitimacy variables 
GRIIR                                      -0.026                                     0.094 
LVIEW                                     -0.040*                                     0.046 
IREN                                      0.022*                                     0.208 
FOFR                                     -0.007                                     0.363 
FRAWOA                       -0.046*                                     0.039 
LSRTEFM                        0.012                                     0.274 
λ(Selectivity correction)        0.046***                                           0.005 
Adjusted R-squared        0.165 
D-W Statistic                       1111 
Number of Observations           116 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
In table 4 we report the results of the corrected least square estimation 
of the violation rate. 
There is evidence that participation is positively selected as a result of 
the lambda (λ) is positive and statistically significant, which is being adjusted. 
From the socio-economic variables it can see that loggers from the Ede Zone 
or with logging experience tend to violate more. Those who target targeting 
thick forest violate to a lesser extent, which is expected, since targeting thick 
forest supply the wood processing factories and these factories request a wood 
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size corresponding to the legal wood size of large inches. Therefore, if a logger 
targets thick forest, the market requirements reduce the probability of this 
logger violating the regulation by 0.23 units compared to the others. 
In the case of deterrence variables, it is remarkable that all the four 
subjective probabilities have the expected negative sign. They are also 
statistically significant, except for the probability of being taken to court after 
being arrested (SPROBTCIA). The insignificance of the SPROBTCIA 
variable may reflect that it is easy to avoid punishment by offering bribes, 
which is what the logger stated in the interviews. All of the 222 loggers in the 
sample had experience of being arrested and 19.35% of them had used bribes 
to avoid being taken to court. In fact, 23% of those who had not violated the 
regulation during the last twelve months had used bribes when being arrested 
to avoid the problems of being taken to court, even though they were innocent. 
In the group of persistent violators, 88.58% avoided being taken to court when 
arrested by the use of bribes. The difference between illegal and legal logging 
size values of logging per crewmember effort (ECPUM) is significant in 
explaining the violation decision. 
 The NOARDPY variable shows that loggers who have experienced 
higher arrest rates tend to violate less. The variable NTFOSDA is negative and 
significant, which indicate that the more often they have seen officials the less 
likely they are to violate. Social and legitimacy variables depicts that there is 
influence on the violation rate seems reduced compared to their importance 
for the decision of whether a logger would be a non-violator or violate the 
regulation. Those who do, in fact, violate are still influenced by the perceived 
compliance rate among their colleagues; if they think that many others would 
violate, then the probability to comply is low. Similarly, they tend to comply 
if their perception is that loggings’ views are considered in the regulation 
design, and if they believe that the regulation benefits all loggings. 
One fundamental issue to address is whether the deterrence or the 
social and legitimacy variables can be excluded. If we look at the adjusted R2 
excluding social, deterrence, and legitimacy, or all three groups of variables, 
then the full model is reduced from 0.17 to 0.22, 0.16, and 0.11, respectively. 
Furthermore, the F-statistics for the various regressions shows that the null 
hypothesis that all social and legitimacy variables are zero can be rejected at 
the 5% level of significance (1.090, critical level 0.91), while zero deterrence 
variables can be rejected at the 1% level (2.518, 1.21). Therefore, conclusion 
can be made that both deterrence and social and legitimacy variables are vital 
in explaining the behavior of the alternating violators. 
 
Conclusion and recommendation  
The basic deterrence model is extended above to allow individual’s 
behavior to be driven by both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. The 
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willingness to comply stemming from moral obligation and social influence is 
based, inter alia, on the perceived legitimacy of the authorities charged with 
implementing the regulations. Some evidence suggests that a key determinant 
of perceived legitimacy is the fairness built into the procedures used to develop 
and implement policy. To the extent that this is valid, regulatory authorities 
should determine what policies and practices are judged fair by those segments 
of the population subject to regulations. This may mean, for example, that civil 
penalties and other sanctions should be comparable in value to the larger of 
the harm done or gains realized. This may mean that individuals subject to 
surveillance and monitoring be treated with dignity and respect. This may 
mean that regulations must appear reasonable and “make sense.” 
 The result of this work supported by empirical evidence, there are a 
number of conclusions for policy that flow from the model developed. Perhaps 
the most important implication is that top-down, command and control-style 
policies likely will not be perceived as legitimate. The result will be policy 
that is ineffective in achieving its goals, and a program that is costly and rife 
with popular dissatisfaction. 
Another implication of this result is that policy makers should pay 
more attention to the fundamental issues of institutional design. Like other 
political and legal institutions in society, regulatory bodies should devote great 
effort to developing legitimacy. The mere fact that an institution is formed 
under a piece of legislation does not necessarily confer on it legitimacy. How 
legitimacy can be earned is beyond the scope of this short contribution, but is 
an important issue worthy of future investigation. 
More equitable procedures for imposing restrictions on the economic 
community should strengthen legitimacy and voluntary compliance. Co-
management regimes, in which participants are empowered to play a 
prominent role in decision making, may be a means of achieving this end 
(Hanna, 1995). This would address, in part, the need to incorporate procedural 
justice in the institution. In the absence of incentive programs, the only control 
mechanism for this subgroup is enforcement. Even if the subgroup of chronic, 
flagrant violators is small and the amount of their illegal activity is minor, they 
need to be controlled. Otherwise, flagrant violators would appear to flaunt 
their violation of the law and to be immune to the regulations. This sends two 
signals to normally law-abiding participants. One is that regulatory procedures 
are unfair, having no effect on flagrant violators. The other is that the 
regulatory program is not effectively achieving its purpose (e.g. protecting the 
fishery resource). Each of these signals weakens the moral obligation to 
comply and the moral basis on which social influence is exercised. As moral 
obligation and social influence are weakened, compliance begins to erode 
among those who would normally comply with the regulations. 
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Similarly, enforcement policies and practices need to be seen by 
participants to be fair. This may mean (though we do not know) that 
enforcement authorities should target chronic and flagrant violators of the 
regulations, punishing them accordingly, while tolerating to some degree 
minor violations by individuals who normally comply with the regulations. 
A collapse of forestry resource, or environmental calamity, can be 
swiftly and severely dealt with by a legitimate authority, imposing on 
participants significant short-term sacrifices. Participants who view the 
authority as legitimate feel a strong obligation to comply even when the 
dictates of the authority are contrary to their self-interest. 
Coercive enforcement measures remain an essential ingredient in any 
compliance regime, even where a high degree of compliance is realized via 
the twin forces of moral obligation and social influence. As noted above, in 
almost any group of individuals subject to regulation there is a core subgroup 
(usually small) of chronic, flagrant violators motivated largely by the direct 
tangible consequences of their actions. Moral obligation and social influence 
have little or no effect on their behavior. Only by changing the economic 
incentives, by reducing the potential illegal gains or by increasing the expected 
penalty, can their illegal activity be controlled. Their subsequent noncompliant 
behavior influences others not to comply with the regulations, and ultimately 
compliance breaks down. Only effective enforcement can reverse and prevent 
this undesirable outcome. 
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